difficulties involved. From time to time I received a message from Masaryk, which enabled me either to understand or occasionally only to surmise the chief things which were going on. It was in accordance with these circumstances that I made my arrangements and decisions in Paris. Beyond this I had only the official Allied reports. This inadequacy of communication was a great handicap.
On two occasions there were differences between us in Paris and our leaders in Russia and Siberia. At the beginning I agreed to the plan of transporting a part of our army by way of Archangelsk, because I saw that the Governments in Paris and London approved of it, and also because I had confidence in the French official reports. Our military leaders, however, expressed themselves against it. It is difficult to say which of the two views was the right one. When I ascertained how our troops were situated I defended their point of view before the Supreme Military Council at Versailles.
The second case was rather more serious. The decision of the executive committee of the army on July 7, 1918, to set up an anti-Bolshevik front in the Volga area, to begin an advance against the Soviets and to proceed further into Central Russia, seemed to me a political and military blunder, and I still think so. I was always in favour of resolute defensive action against the Bolsheviks, of establishing a firm front to cover the gradual evacuation, thus making it possible for our troops to leave Siberia by gradations and in good time without any detriment to their morale. The scheme which had been started, however, was not adequately prepared. It counted upon Allied help which could not be given, and was stimulated partly by the insistence of the anti-Bolshevik elements in Russia, partly by unfounded reports about Allied intervention which was alleged to be already in progress. Moreover, the hopes of any adequate help from Russian quarters proved to be vain. The scheme was therefore doomed to be abortive.
In view of the controversy about the use of our army and our policy in Siberia and France at this time, I draw attention to an official telegram concerning an interview which Masaryk had with M. Regnault, the French Ambassador in Tokio, just about this period in the middle of April. It is an extremely valuable document, and gives a good idea of our plans with regard to the army in Siberia, and of Masaryk’s views on the situation in Russia at that time. The telegram runs as follows:
