had secured a clause in the peace of Brest-Litovsk by which Russia undertook not to allow on her territory any foreign or Allied armies, and they then exerted a strong pressure in this direction upon the Soviet Government. They hoped that in this way they would succeed in dispersing our army, and it seems that the Central Powers also instructed the Austro-Hungarian and German prisoners of war, especially in Siberia, to promote this policy.
Thus the lack of confidence on both sides, which was, I think, quite natural and comprehensible, increased until the inevitable conflict ensued. As early as April 13, 1918, at a military conference between a part of the leaders of our first division the majority were in favour of not handing over arms in future to the local Soviet authorities in accordance with the agreement between us and the Bolsheviks, but to proceed forcibly eastward, using, if necessary, other means than negotiation. The congress was, however, a confidential one, and officially the army knew nothing about its resolutions. The military leaders themselves had not trusted the Soviet authorities from the very beginning when the agreement of March 26th had come into force, and on their own initiative they had retained a quantity of arms exceeding the stipulated amount. The branch of the National Council was aware of this and tacitly sanctioned it. In other respects, however, both the branch of the National Council and the leaders of the army corps endeavoured loyally to fulfil the terms of the agreement with the Bolshevik Government.
Nevertheless, our army managed to proceed eastward during the month of April, although its progress was very slow and precarious. At the beginning of April some of the Allied military authorities devised a scheme by which a part of our army was to be transported to the Western front by way of Archangelsk. But this plan aroused fresh suspicions, uncertainty, and disputes in the ranks of our troops.(50) They had formed the idea that this was a trick on the part of the Bolshevik Government to divide them into two camps. They were also afraid that if the journey were made by sea from Archangelsk the Germans would get to know about the departure of the vessels and would sink the transports. It was certainly a tactical and political blunder that the Allied plan was not notified in time and in sufficient detail either to the Czech military leaders or the branch of the National Council in Moscow, but the negotiations on this subject were carried on between the Allied repre-
