XVI
(a) The Allies and our Army in Siberia. The Question of Intervention in Russia
127
The month of July 1918 became a period of decisive change in the action of our Siberian troops. While I in Paris throughout April, May, and even June had based my political negotiations on the question of transporting our Siberian troops to France, the development of events in Siberia was such that, at the beginning of July, and especially in August, I had to adopt a slightly different line for the continuance of my political campaign.
The opposition of our troops to the local Soviets on May 25th, 26th, and 27th, and the struggle for the occupation of the Siberian Railway in the first half of June, caused the French authorities in Russia and also in France to consider for a short time some new military scheme in Russia.
The question of intervention in Russia was as old as the Bolshevik revolution itself. I have already mentioned that the British military authorities had something similar in view, i.e. some kind of “small” intervention at the outset, by which they desired, on the one hand, to preserve access to Russia by way of Archangelsk and Murman, on the other hand to check the advance of Bolshevism to Baikal, where they feared its effects upon their policy in the Far East. They carried out this “small” intervention by their own means and methods from the very beginning. Then when they saw the increasing strength of the Czechoslovak Army they at once considered the possibility of using it for these purposes. The objection of our troops, who wished to proceed to France, and the French policy on the subject of our army, which was in agreement with the consistent policy of our National Council, caused the English also to assent to the transport of our troops to Europe. Having sanctioned this
