would be of much use to the Allies from a military point of view. I could have seen some point in a united intervention on a large scale with definite political aims, directed towards the construction of an Eastern front. I knew, however, that for a scheme of this kind there was neither the determination nor the resources, and I feared the effects of any vague and half-hearted action for the Allies and for Russia, to say nothing of ourselves, since our troops would fall a victim to it. I therefore continued to lay stress upon our line of policy: We would not interfere in Russian affairs, and in any case we were anxious to transfer our army to France. For I considered that our best course was to have the greatest part of our army in Europe, where a decision would be reached as to the fate of the Habsburg Empire.
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Here I should like to insert a few remarks about the policy of the Soviet Government at that time. All indications show that this Government, as long as it feared a German invasion, which might lead to its destruction, aimed at being on good terms and even co-operating with our troops and the Allies. The guiding idea of the Soviet Government was obviously to pursue a course which involved the least menace to its authority, and at that moment, not having any other interest or purpose than to maintain its position, the Soviet Government was prepared to keep in with all those who made such a course possible, and to proceed against any who endangered it.
That is why at Bakhmatch the Bolshevik troops kept on our side, and that is why, during the struggle for the Ukraine, they advanced against the Germans. In the same way Antonov-Ovseyenko, the military representative of the Soviets at Kursk, made friendly declarations concerning our troops. The Germans soon became aware of this. Their policy, prompted also by other considerations, before long was directed so as to avoid, as far as possible for the time being, any menace to the Soviet regime. The consequence was that the Soviet Government, seeing that for some time there was no immediate danger to be feared from Germany, became aware that the possible sources of danger comprised the Allies and our troops.
Thus, by its mere existence, our army became a serious problem to the Soviet Government. The Government at Moscow was familiar with the tendencies of our troops, who had no great liking for the Bolshevik regime. Moreover, the
