emphasize the scope of all these arrangements. Lord Robert Cecil promised me this, and the Foreign Office made the necessary arrangements through diplomatic channels.
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The far-reaching importance of the London agreements was realized in all Allied circles, both among the Government authorities and the politicians. It was not long before I myself saw Clear indications of this. I will just mention two of the most typical cases.
As on all similar occasions I informed the French and Italian Ambassadors, as well as the Serbian Minister in London, about the proceedings. I was particularly anxious that Italy, having a direct interest in Austro-Hungarian affairs, should have a precise knowledge of the situation, and should realize that we were undertaking no steps which were not in accordance with her interests. For this reason, as soon as I arrived in London at the end of June, I quite frankly explained to Marquis Imperiali what my purpose was, and I asked him to use his influence for me with the English Government, while notifying to his own Government my proceedings in London. Marquis Imperiali was willing to help me, but at the same time he doubted whether the English Government, which hitherto had shown itself somewhat conservative as regards Austro-Hungarian affairs, would show any readiness to take so decisive a step openly. This view was in accordance with the policy of Rome and particularly with that of Sonnino. At that time there were considerable differences of opinion on this subject in the Roman Cabinet, but they terminated with the well-known Italian communiqué passed on September 9th and published on September 22nd, in which Bissolati’s point of view in favour of Jugoslav unity was adopted with the more emphatic action in Austro-Hungarian affairs which it involved. I am inclined to think that our successes in London made this decision possible and, in fact, helped directly to bring it about. It should be remembered that the British Government at that time, as Mr. Balfour and Lord Robert Cecil pointed out to me, did not agree with Sonnino’s policy in Jugoslav affairs, and on account of Italian opposition were unable to do anything decisive for the settlement of the problems which they presented. The assistance given to us, however, tended, in my opinion, indirectly to further the
