ourselves as a constituent part of the provisional revolutionary Government existing de facto in Bohemia, and I called upon them at home to maintain this conception, so that whatever might happen in Bohemia there would be no break in the unity between us in this respect.
Under no circumstances (I wrote) must there arise any dissension or schism between us. Nor must there be one Government coming into existence here, and another Government among you. Whenever a Government is to come into existence in Bohemia, the step must be taken in agreement with us, in unity with us, and in continuity with us. . . . It is out of the question for the Allies to instigate any negotiations whatever with Austria-Hungary. This is an eventuality which need not be feared. Nor need there be any misgivings as to whether the Allies intend to fight to a finish. It would therefore be a suicidal policy on our part to make any arrangements with Austria. For these reasons we consider it essential for you, at the right moment (we do not wish to decide this, as you will be in a better position to judge), to refuse point-blank to enter Parliament, and also to break off all relations with Austria-Hungary. You would thus demonstrate that you understood what was meant when the Allies proclaimed us an Allied nation.
At the same time we urge you not to provoke the Germans or anybody else to a premature revolt. Any revolution which is to come, and for which you should be prepared and organized, must take place in agreement with us. The chief military move on the part of the Allies will not be made until the spring. By that time we shall be adequately organized, and as a Government we shall be able to reach a definite political and military agreement with the Allies on the subject of the plan for overthrowing Austria-Hungary by an external offensive and an internal revolution.
I concluded my message by giving concise information as to the stage reached by our movement abroad and the position of our troops, especially in Siberia. I dispatched the message on September 5th, and accelerated as much as possible the realization of all the plans referred to, in view of the Allied military situation and our agreement with the Allied Governments, and particularly in view of what was then taking place in Austria-Hungary. The reports of critical happenings there were so precise that I was prepared for the utmost possibility, especially as a number of messages arriving from Prague via Geneva referred to the possibility of an impending military capitulation on the part of the monarchy. I was somewhat disturbed by rumours that the Austrian Government were preparing to revise the constitution. From time to time statements emanating from pacifist quarters were published, from which it appeared
