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Page:My war memoirs (by Edvard Beneš, 1928).pdf/441

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PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE
433

National Council also shared—some more, some less—these various fears regarding the possibility of a compromise. We all realized, too, the momentous historical significance of the decisions which were being made. On my arrival the first thing I did was to report to my colleagues in the secretariat on affairs in Italy. We then discussed what we should do next, and we all agreed that I must first ascertain from all our friends what the situation was, and what steps were being prepared.

Accordingly, I made inquiries on these points from M. Vesnić, who had taken part in the Allied negotiations, and who at once gave me news which set my mind at rest. I also approached several French friends and then, on the morning of October 14th, I called on Berthelot at the Foreign Ministry, and reported to him about my Italian visit, at the same time letting him know that all preparations had been made for carrying out our plans. I asked him to inform me how matters were being viewed in Paris. In consideration of the agreements which we had hitherto made with the Allies, I questioned him directly about the negotiations with Austria and again insisted upon the necessity for the Allies, now more than ever, to hold out until the end. He replied emphatically and without hesitation: “There can be no question whatever of any serious separate negotiations with Austria. The forces which have been let loose cannot be held up. Nothing can avert the downfall of the Central Powers; Austria is condemned to destruction and cannot be saved. Even if an attempt were made in one quarter or another at some sort of negotiations, it would merely be an insignificant intrigue. The elemental forces and fateful influences which are now at work can no longer be mastered by human beings.”

Such was Berthelot’s diagnosis. His conviction as to the outcome of the war and the fate of the Central Empires had, as a matter of fact, been always very firm, even at the most critical periods of the war. This opinion I shared with him.

145

The discussion between President Wilson and the German Minister of Foreign Affairs was followed by the whole world with close and anxious attention. It was felt by everybody that each of President Wilson’s replies was pressing the German Government more and more into a tight corner. As I have already stated, the fact that President Wilson was not replying to Austria-Hungary while carrying on this exciting diplomatic

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