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474
MY WAR MEMOIRS

The States which had newly arisen (for example, the new Austria and the new Hungary) had not hitherto existed from the point of view of international law, as they had not been recognized. The negotiations with their authorities had, for the time being, been only of a local character designed for the maintenance of order in the locality concerned and without any political implications. Of the new States, Czechoslovakia was the only one which existed on a basis of international law. Serbia and Rumania had only their old territory, the problems involved by their new areas not having been settled. The juridical situation of Austria, Hungary, and Poland was altogether vague and uncertain.

M. Clemenceau, in granting permission to General Franchet d’Esperey to arrange a special Armistice, assured me by telegram on November 12th that this Armistice was not to affect any political questions. Nevertheless, by Article 17 of the Armistice, it was stipulated that for the time being the whole of Hungarian territory, except Croatia-Slavonia, was to be left under the local administration of the Magyar authorities. This article was then interpreted by the Magyars as an Allied recognition of the integral character of Hungary, and was adduced as an argument against the occupation of Slovakia by our troops and officials. The dispute arising from this was very serious, difficult, and dangerous, both juridically and politically, and it cost us much labour and anxiety. The question of Károlyi’s Armistice, however, gave me an opportunity of settling this point once and for all, and securing an Allied decision which was of far-reaching importance to our territorial questions and also to our internal consolidation.

As I have already mentioned, Károlyi made use of all possible ways and means of saving for Hungary whatever could be saved. Several times he applied to the Allies with proclamations, telegrams, and personal appeals, emphasizing very skilfully that there should be no resolution creating a prejudice with regard to the integral character of Hungary and its administrative unity until the signature of the Peace Treaty. Everybody will understand what it would have meant for the territorial demands of the oppressed races in Hungary if that country had continued to be occupied by the Magyars until the signature of the Trianon Peace Treaty, i.e. August 1920. He also endeavoured to obtain a special Allied permission for Hungary to judge impartially the frontier question, and in this connection