see later, a settlement favourable to us was reached, and no further difficulties arose on this point. A month later an analogous question concerning the German regions of Bohemia had to be considered, and the settlement was again in our favour.
Károlyi, continuing his very skilful tactics, and judging that he was fully covered by his Belgrade Armistice, sent a special note to Prague on November 17, 1918, protesting against the occupation of Slovakia. Dr. Kramář replied to him on the following day, his argument being the one acknowledged by Paris, to the effect that the Czechoslovak State had been recognized by the Allies even before the change of regime, and this recognition applied also to the territories inhabited by the Slovaks. The Magyar Government could not therefore arrange an armistice on behalf of Slovakia, which was an integral part of the Czechoslovak State. Dr. Kramář then informed me of what had happened, and asked for immediate intervention. In this way the struggle for Slovakia was transferred to Paris.
From the second half of November onwards I was daily occupied discussing and negotiating this matter with military circles and politicians. As on previous occasions, I first saw Berthelot, who at once recognized our point of view as being the right one, and I then approached Pichon, Clemenceau, and Marshal Foch, as well as representatives of Great Britain and the United States. I pointed out to them that the Magyar action would inevitably result in a new armed conflict, sooner or later. In the course of these proceedings, it became obvious that there was a definite difference of opinion between the military and the political circles. The politicians regarded General Franchet d’Esperey’s Armistice as a blunder, since it had been arranged in a manner which might prove prejudicial to some of the Allied wishes. After some hesitation it was acknowledged that the blunder must be rectified. I accordingly asked that the exact significance of Franchet d’Esperey’s Armistice should be interpreted, and I also insisted that at the same time the frontiers should be fixed between the Magyars and ourselves so as to be a guarantee against any further surprise action, and also a proof that Slovakia did actually belong to us. I went into this matter on several occasions with Marshal Foch, who agreed to my suggestions, and finally proposed that I should settle a line of demarcation, which he would notify to Budapest, and behind which the Magyars would be compelled to withdraw. I therefore indicated what I regarded as a suitable line for this
