The negotiations with the English were more difficult, but I succeeded nevertheless in obtaining their consent also. They promised that they would make the same arrangements as the French in the matter, and a few days later the British Embassy in Paris informed me that the British Government had taken steps in the sense of the English note.
It was the Americans who caused the greatest difficulty. I discussed affairs with Colonel House and his entourage, comprising Captain Lippman and Major Bonsal. Already at that time the Americans were paying close attention to all arguments which were based upon the historical frontiers of the new States. Those working with Colonel House told me that they feared to create prejudicial results in this matter. If they acknowledged our historical frontiers, what were they to say to the Poles, who were making an analogous claim, but with whose demands it was impossible to comply? They were not opposed to our point of view, but they were unwilling to commit themselves before the Peace Conference, for if they were to give their consent to the occupation of the territories demanded, that would be tantamount to a settlement of the whole question. Finally, however, they too gave their consent when I entered into a definite commitment that the Czechoslovak Government would unconditionally accept the decision of the Peace Conference as final.
It will be readily understood how wide was the scope of these decisions, and it was natural that under such circumstances I felt optimistic about the Teschen question. As early as December 22nd I telegraphically notified Dr. Kramář of this decision, and two days later I sent him a special communication containing the texts of my statements to the Allies as well as of their decisions as to our right to occupy the territory in question. Our Government thereupon carried out the occupation in due course.
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The transport of our troops from France and Italy was unexpectedly delayed. The first resolutions for their prompt removal were passed at a moment when it was thought that hostilities would have to be continued against Germany from the south. When the Armistice with Germany was concluded, the Supreme French Command had no further interest in the matter and kept putting it off, more particularly as the French
