they were much more decisively opposed to Vienna, that Pichon, realizing the danger of disagreements (Wilson’s declaration on the claims of Italy and the London Pact), proposed that a joint Allied programme on this subject should be drawn up. There was so much uncertainty and disunity on this point, and also so great a fear that it might lead to disagreement between the Allies, that a decision was made for each of the Allies in the meanwhile to proceed independently in this respect.
(45) After my conversations with Clemenceau I then believed that all our troops would be transferred to France in three months.
(46) This Article runs as follows: “The Emperor is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces; he declares war and makes peace.”
(47) This declaration, which was made on December 23, 1917, runs as follows: “The question of the State allegiance of national groups having no State independence, cannot, in the view of the Quadruple Entente Powers, be adjusted on inter-State lines. This question should be settled as the case arises by each separate State with its nationalities independently by a constitutional process.”
(48) In May and August 1918 Dr. Štěpánek sent to Paris two reports in which he gave us a detailed account of his scheme for getting away from the Dalmatian islands to Italy with important political and military news by means of a submarine. The scheme would have demanded proceedings on the part of the Allies which we could not have asked for at that time, more particularly from Italy, which was very mistrustful in these matters. I replied to this effect in my report to Prague on June 14, 1918. Dr. Štěpánek, nevertheless, with remarkable courage, managed to cross the Adriatic in an ordinary boat with his friend Giunio, towards the end of October 1918, at a moment when the Empire was on the point of collapsing. He was first stopped in Italy, but then reached Paris where he took part particularly in the negotiations arising from the differences among the Jugoslavs. In November he returned from Paris to Prague as one of the first envoys with news about preparations for the Peace Conference.
(49) This report probably referred to the first conflicts of our transport divisions at Penza and Samara with the local Soviets.
(50) As far as I have been able to ascertain, the idea of concentrating or transporting our army by way of Archangelsk and Murmansk first made its appearance in an official document of the British War Office on April 1, 1918. From that date onwards the French military authorities also took it into account. It is first quoted in the French official documents on April 20th. A similar plan emerged in Russia also about the same time, whether under the influence of the telegrams from Paris and London, or independently, I do not know.
(51) The divergency of views between England and France as to the employment of our Russian army was settled two weeks later at the Franco-British Conference in London, where an official resolution on this subject was passed in accordance with our ideas.
(52) Clemenceau’s remarks on this occasion included the following: “I want to have all your troops in France. I consider them first-rate soldiers. We will give you a declaration and will acknowledge your independence. You must be independent because you deserve it. You can rely on me not to leave you in the lurch.”
(53) As soon as Masaryk, who was in Washington at the time, received the text of this document he sent Pichon a telegram of thanks.
