It would not be judicially proper to go further than that in the absence of properly admitted expert evidence. I think it necessary to point out, in the context of the present case, that apart from freedom of expression,[1] freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion are also constitutionally protected values under the 1996 Constitution.[2] The issues in this case touch on deep convictions and evoke strong emotions. It must not be thought that the view which holds that sexual expression should be limited to marriage between men and women with procreation as its dominant or sole purpose, is held by crude bigots only. On the contrary, it is also sincerely held, for considered and nuanced religious and other reasons, by persons who would not wish to have the physical expression of sexual orientation differing from their own proscribed by the law[3]. It is nevertheless equally important to point out, that such views, however honestly and sincerely held, cannot influence what the Constitution dictates in regard to discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.
[39]There is nothing in the jurisprudence of other open and democratic societies based
- ↑ Under section 16 of the 1996 Constitution.
- ↑ Under section 15 thereof.
- ↑ See, for example, Professor John M Finnis “Law, Morality and Sexual Orientation” in 69 Notre Dame Law Review 1049 (1994).
