While some of the groups may have limited government connections, we have no reporting to indicate that these efforts were directed at the Kremlin’s behest.
- In 2022, cyber actors visited websites associated with the election, the US Senate and House of Representatives, and a named member of Congress, This activity is consistent with open-source information gathering, and we have no indication that hacked the websites or planned follow-on operations.
- On Election Day, multiple pro-Russia hacktivist groups declared their support for the Republican Party, most likely to try to garner media attention and raise questions about the integrity of the election. One group—the Cyber Army of Russia—encouraged cyber attacks against targets affiliated with the Democratic Party, calling them a “present for Republicans,” and also claimed responsibility for a confirmed distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack against a US state government’s public-facing website, according to a US cyber security firm assessment, and open-source reports. The DDoS incident did not affect any infrastructure used to cast or tally ballots.
(U) Cuba
A range of additional foreign actors took some steps to undermine US politicians seeking reelection. Their preferences for who would win varied. in general, we assess that they were smaller in scale and more narrowly targeted than the activities conducted by China, Iran, and Russia.
(U) Cuba
We assess that Cuba attempted to undermine the electoral prospects of specific US Congressional and gubernatorial politicians that it perceived as hostile. Havana probably intended these efforts to advance its foreign policy goals, which include removing sanctions, travel restrictions, and its State Sponsor of Terrorism designation, and public statements by Cuban officials.
- We assess that Havana probably tailored its efforts based on its perception of the US politicians’ stances on US policies toward Cuba
- The Cuban Government sought to influence perceptions of politicians belonging to both major US political parties, suggesting that partisan affiliation is not the sole consideration for its targeting efforts.
Havana focused on operations aimed at denigrating specific US candidates in Florida, although it probably attempted to shape impressions of other US politicians, Public Cuban Government statements indicate that Havana views Cuban-Americans in Miami as having an outsized influence on US policy in Cuba.
- In 2022, a network of social media accounts almost certainly covertly tied to the Cuban Government created and amplified derogatory content
- Havana sought to identify and establish relationships with
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