(U) Scope Note
This Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA)—prepared pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 13848(1)(a)—addresses key foreign actors’ intentions and efforts to influence or interfere with the 2022 US elections and to undermine public confidence in the US election process. It builds on analysis by CIA, DHS, FBI, the National Intelligence Council, NSA, and other IC elements published throughout the election cycle and provided to Executive Branch and Congressional stakeholders. This assessment references both licit and illicit activity that occurred during this election cycle to provide a holistic view of foreign plans, intentions, and operations. It does not include an assessment of the impact influence and interference activities may have had on the outcome of the elections in 2022. The IC is charged with monitoring and assessing the intentions, capabilities, and actions of foreign actors; it does not analyze US political processes, actors, election administration, vote tabulation processes, or public opinion.
- (U) Pursuant to EO 13848(1)(a), not later than 45 days after the conclusion of a United States election, the DNI, in consultation with the heads of any other appropriate executive departments and agencies, shall conduct an assessment of any information indicating that a foreign government, or any person acting as an agent of or on behalf of a foreign government, has acted with the intent or purpose of interfering in that election. The assessment shall identify, to the maximum extent ascertainable, the nature of any foreign interference and any methods employed to execute it, the persons involved, and the foreign government or governments that authorized, directed, sponsored, or supported it.
- (U) Pursuant to EO 13848(1)(b), the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security will subsequently evaluate the impact of any such efforts on the security or integrity of election infrastructure or infrastructure pertaining to a political organization, campaign, or candidate in a 2020 US federal election.
- (U) Pursuant to EO 13848(3)(a), the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, will impose appropriate sanctions for activities determined to constitute foreign interference in a US election.
(U)Definitions
(U In 2022, the IC updated its lexicon for foreign malign influence to ensure a common reference guide of country-agnostic terms on this topic. These definitions share some similarities but are not identical to the definition of foreign interference outlined in EO 13848; that definition was inclusive of election interference and election influence.
- (U For the purpose of this assessment, election interference includes efforts aimed at degrading or disrupting a target’s ability to hold elections, including by targeting the physical or technical aspects of an election. This includes cyber operations affecting a government’s ability to register voters, cast and count ballots, or report results; cyber operations degrading a campaign’s ability to participate in an election; cyber or physical operations targeting election officials, poll workers, or polling places; and assassinations or military or security interventions affecting an election.
- (U Election influence includes covert or overt efforts by foreign governments, non-state actors, or their proxies, specifically intended, directly or indirectly, to affect an election. These activities can include efforts to sway public opinion; shape voter preferences for specific candidates or political parties; motivate or suppress specific voting blocs by raising contentious social issues; mislead voters about the time, manner, or place of voting; or undermine confidence in the results or political processes, regardless of whether these activities have a material impact on an election.
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