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(U) Foreign Threats to the 2022 US Elections 23 December 2022 ICA 2022-27259-A |
(U) Discussion
We assess that the aggregate scale and scope of foreign activity targeting the US midterm elections exceeded what we detected during the previous midterm elections in 2018. We did not observe a directive from any foreign leader to undertake a comprehensive, whole-of-government influence campaign, something not seen since 2016. While the activity we detected remained below the level we expect to observe during presidential election years, the IC identified a diverse and growing group of foreign actors engaging in such operations, including China's greater willingness to conduct election influence activities than in past cycles. The involvement of more foreign actors probably reflects shifting geopolitical risk calculus, perceptions that election influence activity has been normalized, the low cost but potentially high reward of such activities, and a greater emphasis on election security in IC collection and analysis.
- During the 2022 US elections, China intensified efforts to heighten sociopolitical divisions, but similar to Cuba it focused more on efforts to support or undermine a small number of specific candidates based on their policy positions. Russia - and probably to a lesser degree, Iran - aimed to heighten broad, existing US sociopolitical tensions and sow distrust in democratic processes through online information operations.
- Foreign policy flashpoints and priorities shaped a number of influence efforts. For example, Moscow incorporated themes designed to weaken US support for Ukraine into its propaganda, highlighting how election influence operations are a subset of broader influence activity directed at the United States.
We detected a range of foreign information manipulation tactics deployed during this election cycle, including the covert use of social media accounts and proxy websites, payments to influencers, and enlistment of public relations (PR) firms. At the same time, we have seen adversaries move to alternative online mediums in response to takedowns by US social media platforms and other disruptions as well as to reach target audiences they perceive as receptive to their messaging.
- We assess that most foreign actors now appear largely focused on amplifying authentic US public narratives to try to influence electoral outcomes, increase mistrust in US election processes, and stoke sociopolitical divisions. This approach provides deniability as foreign actors propagate US content to try to exploit existing fissures.
Notably, we have not seen persistent foreign government cyber efforts to gain access to and tamper with US election infrastructure since the presidential election in 2016, when Russia almost certainly reconnoitereed election networks in all US states and accessed election-related infrastructure in at least two states. Several factors may explain this development, including foreign actors' perceptions that they can have more impact with other operations, challenges they faced targeting the US election system, and heightened awareness of an resilience to cyber operations.
Rather than foreign actors engaging in broad interference designed to alter votes—which is technically challenging—some adversaries probably believed that they were best
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