vacated the district court’s other holding that no court, or itself, may entertain a habeas action on behalf of a detainee held in Guantanamo, Cuba. Id. Additional Circuit precedent stands for the same proposition. See Massie, 244 F.3d at 1199 (affirming the district court’s conclusion that a litigant seeking a stay of execution on behalf of another person “lacked standing” as a next friend under Whitmore).[1]
- B. Standing must be jurisdictional because of its preclusive effect.
Judgments are preclusive. See, e.g., Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars litigation in a subsequent action of any claims that were raised or could have been raised in the prior action.” (citations omitted) ). If the putative next friend is not the appropriate entity, but the case is allowed to go forward, an improper representative can create preclusive precedent that, forever, bars the real party in interest. This preclusive effect alone requires that the question of next-friend standing be decided before the merits question and, if there is no next-friend standing, the case must be dismissed so the proper party may bring the case if she so chooses.
- C. Cetacean did not impliedly overrule Coalition or Whitmore.[2]
The Majority’s conclusion that Cetacean somehow makes next-friend standing nonjurisdictional tortures the case and legal reasoning to reach such a conclusion. First, both Whitmore and Coalition were decided before Cetacean. Accordingly, those binding cases, which directly answer the question of whether next-friend standing is jurisdictional, were binding on the Cetacean panel as well.
Second, Cetacean is silent on next-friend standing. Indeed, even the briefing did not raise the issue. Rather, the Cetacean court seemed to conclude that animals may have Article III standing,[3] and then examined the statutory standing questions before it. 386 F.3d at 1174–79. The Cetacean court did not (though it most certainly should have) examine whether it was appropriate for a “self-appointed attorney” to bring a ease on behalf of the “Cetacean Community” and articulate “their” interests. Id. at
- ↑ The Majority argues that I err by using next-friend cases to conclude that we lack jurisdiction in this case. Maj. Op. at 423–24 n.5. But, next-friend standing is the only basis for jurisdiction PETA has alleged. Compl. at 3 (stating PETA “b[rought] this action on behalf of, and as next friend[ ] to, Naruto”). Both the Majority and I agree that PETA does not have next-friend standing and that animals can never have next-friend standing. This should end our inquiry. Further, as a general rule, the proponent of a case must advance its own injury. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197. Next-friend standing is an exception to this rule. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 161–63, 110 S.Ct. 1717. Naruto did not bring his own claim, PETA does not assert its own injury, and both the Majority and I agree PETA cannot be Naruto’s next friend. There are no other jurisdictional bases on which to rest our authority to resolve this case.
- ↑ The Majority accuses me of “pretend[ing] Cetacean does not exist, or that it states something other, or milder, or more ambiguous on whether cetaceans have Article III standing” and arguing for a “blanket exclusion of animals from Article III jurisdiction.” Maj. Op. at 423–24 n.5, 424 n.6. My conclusion does not “pretend Cetacean does not exist”; it simply requires Cetacean be applied within the legal framework that governs cases where a plaintiff’s claims are brought by someone else. Such claims may only be advanced by a next friend and, if one is not available or legally possible, those claims cannot be redressed. As I demonstrate in this section, Cetacean does not hold to the contrary.
- ↑ Although binding precedent, I agree with the Majority that granting Article III standing to animals was an incorrect conclusion.
