not sue as Naruto’s next friend. In Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990), the Supreme Court discussed “next friend” standing in a habeas case in which a third-party litigant sought to challenge the death sentence of a capital defendant, Simmons, who had forsworn his right to appeal. In considering whether the third-party, Whitmore, had standing to sue on behalf of Simmons, the Court emphasized the limited nature of “next friend” standing and explained the rationale behind its limitations. For example, requiring a showing of incompetency and a “significant relationship” ensures that “the litigant asserting only a generalized interest in constitutional governance” does not “circumvent the jurisdictional limits of Article III simply by assuming the mantle of ‘next friend.’ ” Id. at 164, 110 S.Ct. 1717. In short, requirements of a significant interest in the subject party protect against abuses of the third-party standing rule. As the Court noted in a prior case, “however worthy and high minded the motives of ‘next friends’ may be, they inevitably run the risk of making the actual [party] a pawn to be manipulated on a chessboard larger than his own case.” Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306, 1312, 100 S.Ct. 3, 61 L.Ed.2d 885 (1979). Based on the dangers inherent in any third-party standing doctrine, the Court declined to expand “next friend” standing beyond what was authorized by Congress in the habeas corpus statute. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164–165, 110 S.Ct. 1717.
Here, we follow the Supreme Court’s lead in holding that “the scope of any federal doctrine of ‘next friend’ standing is no broader than what is permitted by the … statute.” Id. Although Congress has authorized “next friend” lawsuits on behalf of habeas petitioners, see 28 U.S.C. § 2242, and on behalf of a “minor or incompetent person,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c), there is no such authorization for “next friend” lawsuits brought on behalf of animals. Our precedent on statutory interpretation should apply to court rules as well as statutes: if animals are to be accorded rights to sue, the provisions involved therefore should state such rights expressly. See Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1179. Because we believe the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Whitmore counsels against court-initiated expansion of “next friend” standing, we decline to recognize the right of next friends to bring suit on behalf of animals, absent express authorization from Congress.
Even so, we must proceed to the merits because Naruto’s lack of a next friend does not destroy his standing to sue, as having a “case or controversy” under Article III of the Constitution. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, which authorizes “next friend” lawsuits, obligates the court “to consider whether [incompetent parties] are adequately protected,” even where they have no “next friend” or “guardian.” U.S. v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 1986). Within this obligation, the court has “broad discretion and need not appoint a guardian ad
tion for breach of confidential relationship against his (former) next friend, PETA, for its failure to pursue his interests before its own. Puzzlingly, while representing to the world that “animals are not ours to eat, wear, experiment on, use for entertainment, or abuse in any other way,” see PETA, https://peta.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2018), PETA seems to employ Naruto as an unwitting pawn in its ideological goals. Yet this is precisely what is to be avoided by requiring next friends to have a significant relationship with, rather than an institutional interest in, the incompetent party—a point made by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306, 1312, 100 S.Ct. 3, 61 L.Ed.2d 885 (1979). See infra page 422 for exact language.
