amendment of the Constitution. But in our federal system the evil is without remedy, if the federal courts be allowed to fix the limits of federal power with reference to those of the States. It would place every thing in the State governments, except their mere existence, at the mercy of a single department of the federal government. The maxim, stare decisis, is not always adhered to by our courts; their own decisions are not held to be absolutely binding upon themselves. They may establish a right to-day and unsettle it to-morrow. A decision of the supreme court might arrest a State in the full exercise of an important and necessary power, which a previous decision of the same court had ascertained that she possessed. Thus the powers of the State governments, as to many important objects, might be kept indeterminate and constantly liable to change, so that they would lose their efficiency, and forfeit all title to confidence and respect. It is true, that in this case, too, there is a possible corrective in the power to amend the Constitution. But that power is not with the aggrieved State alone; it could be exerted only in connexion with other States, whose aid she might not be able to command. And even if she could command it, the process would be too slow to afford effectual relief. It is impossible to imagine that any free and sovereign State ever designed to surrender her power of self-protection in a case like this, or ever meant to authorize any other power to reduce her to a situation so helpless and contemptible.[1]
- ↑ This want of uniformity and fixedness, in the decisions of courts, renders the supreme court the most unfit umpire that could be selected, between the federal government and the States, on questions involving their respective rights and powers. Suppose that the United States should resolve to cut a canal through the territory of Virginia; and being resisted, the supreme court should decide that they had a right to do so. Suppose that, when the work was completed, a similar attempt should be made in Massachusetts; and being resisted, the same court should decide that they had no right to do so. The effect would be that the United States would possess a right in one State, which it did not possess in another. Suppose that Virginia should impose a tax on the arsenals, dock-yards, &c. of the United States within her territory, and that, in a suit to determine the right, the supreme court should decide in favor of it. Suppose that a like attempt should be made by Massachusetts, and, upon a similar appeal to that court, it should decide against it; Virginia would enjoy a right in reference to the United States, which would be denied to Massachusetts. Other cases may be supposed, involving like consequences, and showing the absurdity of submitting to courts of justice the decision of
