however, says: He need bring only one sin-offering. What is R. Johanan's reason? Because it is written [Lev. iv. 28]: "For his sin, which he hath committed," and he adduces therefrom that for every sin committed one must bring a separate sin-offering, and Resh Lakish holds according to the passage [ibid. 26], "Concerning his sin, and it shall be forgiven him," and claims that it being one and the same sin, only one sin-offering is sufficient. But what will Resh Lakish do with the verse, "For his sin which he hath committed"? That refers to the sin-offering which had already been brought, and therefore could not apply to a later sin. And what about R. Johanan and the passage, "Concerning his sin, and it shall be forgiven"? R. Johanan explains this as follows: If a man ate tallow equivalent (in size) to an olive and a half, and later ate another piece the size of half an olive. Afterward he recollected having eaten tallow, but thought that it was the size of one olive, might some not say that the remaining piece eaten in the first instance should be added to the piece eaten in the second instance, and thus constitute another piece the equivalent (in size) to an olive, and make him liable for another sin-offering? Therefore the passage which means: After once having obtained forgiveness for the transgression on the first occasion the second cannot be counted in with the first.
It was taught: If one intended to pick up a thing detached (for instance, a knife that had fallen in a row of vegetables), and while doing so (accidentally) cut off one of the growing vegetables, he is free.[1] If, however, he intended to cut something lying on (but not attached to) the ground, and instead cut off something growing out of (attached to) the ground, Rabha
- ↑ In the Tract Kritoth the reason of the man's non-culpability is explained as follows: It is written [Lev. iv. 23], "If now his sin wherein he has sinned come to his knowledge," and this should be supplemented with "but not the sin which he had not in mind to commit at all." Whence we see plainly that the Scripture designates as an unintentional sinner only one who knows wherein he has sinned; for instance, if he became aware that it was Sabbath, or that the acts performed by him were prohibited. In our case, however, where a man intended to pick up a thing but accidentally cut a thing, it is evident that no intention to cut existed in the man's mind, and the intent of the "wherein he has sinned" in the Scriptures does not apply to him. Rabha goes further and says that even if one actually accomplished an act he had in mind and which was permissible on the Sabbath, but at the same time accidentally committed a prohibited act (as illustrated in the above instance), even in such a case the scriptural "wherein he has sinned" cannot apply, nor can he be accounted the scriptural unintentional sinner who is liable for a sin-offering. Abayi, however, differs with him, as will be seen farther on.
