19.
it thinks fit with regard to the operation of the corporation, for example, may prescribe what officers and servants it shall employ, what shall be the hours and conditions of labour, what remuneration shall be paid to them, and may thus, in the case of such corporations, exercise complete control of the domestic trade carried on by them."
49 By "domestic trade", Griffith CJ meant "domestic trade within the State", that is, trade other than trade of the kind referred to in s 51(i). He treated, as part of such trade, contracts made between constitutional corporations and their employees. He read down s 51(xx) by reference to the limitations inherent in s 51(i). The foundation of the reasoning of the majority in Huddart Parker was undermined by Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd ("the Engineers' Case")[1] in 1920, but the decision was not formally overruled until 1971, when Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd ("the Concrete Pipes Case")[2] held that Huddart Parker was wrongly decided. Since then, the corporations power has provided the constitutional basis for legislation prohibiting anti-competitive conduct by constitutional corporations, including conduct in what Griffith CJ called "domestic trade", notwithstanding the limitations upon the power of the Parliament to pass laws with respect to such trade contained within s 51(i).
50 No party to these proceedings questioned the authority of the Engineers' Case, or the Concrete Pipes Case, or the validity of the Trade Practices Act in its application to the domestic (intra-State) trade of constitutional corporations. Necessarily, however, the plaintiffs experienced difficulty in accommodating their submissions to those developments. If s 51(xx) is not affected by the limitations inherent in s 51(i), why is it affected by the limitations inherent in s 51(xxxv)? If, in the exercise of its powers under s 51(xx), the Commonwealth Parliament can regulate the terms and conditions on which constitutional corporations may deal with their customers, or their suppliers of goods or services, why can it not, in the exercise of the same powers, regulate the terms and conditions on which constitutional corporations may deal with employees, or with prospective employees? If, as Griffith CJ recognised, a corporation's dealings with its employees are part of its trading activities, how can it be that the Parliament has power to prohibit constitutional corporations from engaging in some forms of business activities (such as anti-competitive behaviour) but not
