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28.

namely matters going to peculiarly corporate characteristics along with the engagement of foreign, trading and financial corporations in trading or financial (broadly business) activities. That is essentially a way of saying that 'the nature of the corporation to which the laws relate must be significant as an element in the nature or character of the laws',[1] or 'the fact that a law binds constitutional corporations does not make it law upon the subject of constitutional corporations unless the personality of the persons bound is a significant element of the law itself',[2] or that the law must discriminate by reference to the relevant character of the corporations in question.[3]"

65 In dealing with these submissions it will be convenient first to say something more about this Court's decision in Huddart Parker, next to look at some matters of nineteenth century history, including the Convention Debates and some aspects of the drafting history of s 51(xx), then to deal with an argument based on some failed referendum proposals, and finally to consider the course of this Court's decisions, about s 51(xx), after Huddart Parker.

66 The examination of those matters will reveal that a distinction of the kind relied on by the plaintiffs, between the external relationships of a constitutional corporation and its internal relationships, does not assist the resolution of the issues presented in these matters. It is a distinction rooted in choice of law rules which cannot, and should not, be transposed into the radically different area of determining the ambit of a constitutional head of legislative power. It is a distinction which finds no support in the Convention Debates or drafting history of s 51(xx). It is a distinction of doubtful stability but, if it were to be adopted, there seems every reason to treat relationships with employees as a matter external to the corporation.

67 In so far as the distinction between external and internal relationships is proffered as a means of limiting what the plaintiffs assert would otherwise be too broad a reach for s 51(xx), it is necessary to consider whether the assertion assumes the answer to the question presented. And in any event it is necessary to examine carefully the context in which such assertions have been made. In that regard, it is essential to recognise the fundamental and far-reaching legal, social,


  1. Fontana Films (1982) 150 CLR 169 at 182 per Gibbs CJ.
  2. Re Dingjan (1995) 183 CLR 323 at 349 per Dawson J.
  3. Re Dingjan (1995) 183 CLR 323 at 337 per Brennan J.