CHAPTER II
a So Möbius, op. cit., p. 28; Ziegler, op. cit., p. 113.
b What Nietzsche thought of style is hinted at in his remark that the only way to improve one's style is to improve one's thought (The Wanderer etc., § 131; cf. Meyer's admirable remarks, op. cit., p. 628). At the same time, there is no doubt that he had fine feeling in this direction. Joël compares him with Goethe, finding him greater in so far as he is more conscious—Goethe's style flowing like nature, Nietzsche's being more art (op. cit., pp. 359-61). Even Saintsbury, after referring to Nietzsche's mention of Leopardi, Emerson, Merimée, and Landor as the four masters of prose in the nineteenth century, says that he is to be put along with them (op. cit., p. 245) . Nietzsche's style—in one particular, at least—might be described as seductive, like Newman's in the Apologia and many of the Sermons: for the moment at least you would like to believe what he says. On the other hand, Meyer notes his occasional slips and negligences of style, and the tastelessness of some of the word-constructions in Zarathustra (op. cit., pp. 624, 416).
c Cf. Rudolph Eisler, Nietzsches Erkenntnisstheorie und Metaphysik; Friedrich Rittelmeyer, Friedrich Nietzsche und das Erkenntnissproblem; Siegbert Flemming, Nietzsches Metaphysik und ihr Verhältniss zu Erkenntnisstheorie und Ethik; also special articles, such as "Friedrich Nietzsches Erkenntnisstheorie," by P. Mauritius Demuth, Philosophischea Jahrbuch (Görres-Gesellschaft), October, 1913. René Berthelot makes an extended critical examination of Nietzsche's theory of knowledge in Un romantisme utilitaire. Vol. I, pp. 33-193.
d Cf. Meyer's view, op. cit., pp. 293, 298, 306, 378, and Ziegler's ("more thinker than poet"), op. cit., p. 21. On the other hand, Heinrich Weinel says, "Whoever allows himself to be persuaded that he [Nietzsche] is a man of strict science will observe with astonishment how easy to refute Nietzsche is, how full of leaps and contradictions his thinking is, even when one clearly separates the epochs of his activity" (Ibsen, Björnson, Nietzsche, pp. 13, 14). Similarly, Oswald Külpe, "The sterner philosophical disciplines, such as logic and the theory of knowledge, Nietzsche touched upon only casually, and never gave himself up to their problems with original interest; and in the other branches, which he liked to cultivate, such as metaphysics and ethics, he has no exact results to offer. We cannot, therefore, call him a philosopher" (Philosophy of the Present in Germany, p. 128). It must be freely conceded that Nietzsche gives us little in the form of strict science, also that he published "no exact results"; whether this prevents his being a substantially consistent thinker with a tolerably definite outcome of thought, is another question.
e A. K. Rogers strangely misconceives Nietzsche at this point (Philosophical Review, January, 1912, p. 39).
f So Kurt Breysig, Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, II (1896), p. 20; contrast Meyer's explanations, op. cit., p. 448.
g Cf. Paul Lanzky's account of Nietzsche's habits, as given in D. Halévy's La Vie de Frédéric Nietzsche, p. 305.
CHAPTER III
a Among philologists he refers to the "renowned Lobeck" in particular. His own view of Dionysus is set forth in The Birth of Tragedy, and he notes that Burckhardt, whom he calls the profoundest connoisseur (Kenner) of Greek culture then living, afterwards added to his Cultur der Griechen [the published title is Griechische Kulturgeschichte] a section
