Page:Nil Durpan.djvu/139

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of prosecutor aginst the defendant, who, whatever his views or position might be, was nevertheless in holy orders; and no matter to what denomination of religion a man belonged, he (the learned Counsel) naturally felt some compunction and regret at having to prosecute in a case where the defendant was in holy orders. But when that reverend defendant was the propagator of slander of a most dangerous kind, when he used his position and means for the purpose of vilifying and slandering his fellowmen without cause, then any feelings of compunction or regret vanished, and the performance of a public duty due to society at large, gave way to all minor or private feelings in the matter. Slander was a most dangerous thing to use at any time, or under any circumstances, but more especially when no reason or cause existed. A man, or any set of men, were not to be held up to public odium without some good and sufficient cause for so doing. Any man is at liberty to think as he likes, or exercise his own judgement, provided that he does not enter into personalities, or attack individuals or particular bodies of men. It was perfectly idle to attempt to deny that a great struggle has for years existed, and was still going on between the official and non-official community in India. The different phases of society in India have been, and are daily canvassed by the press of this country, and what sensible man objected to a free and open discussion by means of the press? But, the defendant had adopted no such course of expressing his views; he had gone secretly to work. At the last sessions, the printer Manuel was indicted and pleaded guilty, disclosing the name of his principal, namely, the Rev. James Long. He must first put to them what constituted libel. The man, who publishes slanderous matter calculated to defame and vilify another, must be presumed to have intended to do that which the publication is calculated to bring about, and the onus of proof lay with the defendant that he did not do so. It might be said, why was not a civil action brought instead of a criminal:—his answer was, that a civil action would not lie, because no particular individual was libelled, and hence the present criminal indictment. He regretted for many reasons that the reverend defendant was debarred from an opportunity of justifying his conduct in a civil action. The Act 32 of George III has not been extended to this country, but powers were held by the Judge the same as in England. He thought

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