fairly claim the privilege of attacking men in authority, men of high station in the Church, and in the profession to which His Lordship has the honor to belong? When there existed abuses, there the press had a right to comment upon them, and rightly too; and it is perfectly lawful to discuss the merits of the decisions of a Judge, provided it be done with candour and decency. If the press were right, the Judge was wrong, and if the press attacked unjustly, the Judge, aided by that public opinion to which even the press must bow, could live it down. The Jury should not approach that great constitutional question, the liberty of the press, without being fully warned. It should never be said that he, as presiding Judge in that Court, failed to put these doctrines fully before the Jury, in a case which concerned the freedom of the press and of public discussion. He therefore did not hesitate to say that if the defendant, in publishing the pamphlet in question, were actuated solely by an honest and conscientious desire to inform the public of abuses, which he thereby hoped to ameliorate, and by no other motive, he would be within the pale of that privilege which the law afforded to every man who acted with good faith in the discharge of a public duty. And especially as a minister of religion would he be entitled to every protection in his efforts to suppress vice and ameliorate the public morals, even although he might in the warmth of feeling and language, express sentiments which should not be otherwise than painful to individuals addressed. The question for the Jury, therefore, would be whether or not upon a consideration of the whole contents of the pamphlet, which formed the subject of this prosecution, there was on the part of the defendant solely a desire, honestly and conscientiously, to benefit society, free from any admixture of other and less pure motives. That could only be determined by a perusal of the document in question, and the passages which had been complained of in the opening speech of the learned Counsel for the prosecution.
It is perfectly true, as stated by Mr. Eglinton in his very able speech, that in an indictment for a libel the defendant cannot plead that the contents are true. In England under 6 and 7 Vict. c. 96 known as Lord Campbell's Act, the defendant may, by way of defence, allege the truth of the matters charged; and further, that it was for the public benefit. If the learned Counsel meant to
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