are satisfied that the literal meaning of its language would extend to cases which the legislature never designed to embrace in it." Brewer v. Blougher, 14 Pet. 178. "If it be true that it is the duty of the court to ascertain the meaning of the legislature from the words used in the statute, and the subject-matter to which it relates, there is an equal duty to restrict the meaning of general words when it is found necessary to do so in order to carry out the legislative intention." Reiche v. Smythe, 13 Wall. 162. "A thing may be within the letter of a statute, and not within its meaning, or within the meaning, though not within the letter." Atkins v. Disintegrating Co., 18 Wall. 302. From these eminent authorities it follows that we have the undoubted right, and it is our solemn duty, to so construe chapter 184 of the Laws of 1890 as to effect the clear intent and purpose of the legislature in its enactment, although such construction may require us to place a limitation upon the language used. We hold, therefore, that the provisions of $ 11 of said act, excepting building and loan associations incorporated under the laws of this state from the operation of the act, was not intended to include, and does not include, the transactions of any such association with any parties other than its own stockholders; and that, as thus limited, the legislature had the power to make the exception; and that, as said chapter is uniform in its operation upon all classes upon which it does operate, it is not vulnerable to any of the constitutional objections urged. The district court is directed to reverse its judgment and dismiss the case. Reversed. All concur.
CORLISS, C. J. (concurring.) I do not understand that the court decides in this case whether the transaction which is attacked as usurious comes within § 4 of the usury law. The question was not argued at the bar of this court, and it is too difficult of solution, and the consequences of a mistake are too far-reaching, to justify an interpretation of § 4 without full argument touching its proper meaning. It having been assumed by all parties that the case fell within § 4, and the entire argument having been directed to the question whether the
