between the car and the engine, on the ground. Perhaps he might not have found room with the foreman on the outside of the curve on the foot-board, but he might have gone ahead, and set the pin, and, if the jar of the collision had not been sufficient to cause the pin to fall down into its place, then he could have inserted it in the aperture with his hands without the slightest danger, or, at least, he then would have plainly seen the danger of going between the engine and the car on the short side of the curve, and could have completed the coupling on the long side. The plaintiff has sustained severe, and perhaps permanent, injuries. His case appeals to our sympathy, and he may be a not unworthy object of charity, but justice will not seize his master's property to compensate him for the consequences of his own imprudence. There seems to be marked unanimity on the point that, where disobedience to or disregard of a reasonable rule or regulation of the master contributes to the injury, there can be no recovery. Sloan v. Railroad Co., 86 Ga. 15, 12 S. E. Rep. 179; Cahill v. Hilton, 106 N. Y. 512, 13 N. E. Rep. 339; Karrer v. Railroad Co., 76 Mich. 400, 43 N. W. Rep. 370; Railroad Co. v. Wallace, (76 Tex., 636 Sup. Ct.), 13 S. W. Rep. 565; Railroad Co. v. Thomas, 51 Miss. 640; Deeds v. Railroad Co., 74 Iowa 154, 37 N. W. Rep. 124; Railroad Co. v. Rice, 51 Ark. 467, 11 S. W. Rep. 699; Sedgwick v. Railroad Co., 76 Iowa 340, 41 N. W. Rep. 35; Wolsey v. Railroad Co., 33 Ohio St. 227; Railroad Co. v. Whitcomb, 111 Ind. 212, 31 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cases 149.
Plaintiff may not ask us to speculate whether, by the exercise of due care, he would have discovered the peril, and avoided the danger, had he made the examination which the rules of the company required. We think an observance of this reasonable rule would have saved him from injury. If he had stopped and looked, and then failed to discover the peril that menaced him, possibly a different case might have been presented. But this is doubtful. The exercise of proper care must have revealed the danger. We hold that this record discloses the fact that plaintiff's own negligence contributed to his injury, and the judgment and order denying the motion for a new trial must therefore be reversed, and a new trial granted.
