were within the original land grant of twenty alternate sections on each side of said road,” and which were, at the time the company filed its map of definite location, not available to the company by reason of having been previously reserved, sold, granted, settled upon, or otherwise appropriated by the United States government. The complaint alleges, in effect, that prior to the filing of any map of definite location by the railroad company, large quantities of the land within the original limits had been settled upon, reserved, and otherwise disposed of by the government, and that, in consequence thereof, the railroad company had, under the provisions of the acts of congress relating thereto, become entitled to select lands—odd-numbered sections—within the ten-mile limit in lieu of such lands in place as were lost to the company as aforesaid. The complaint further states that after it became known that quantities of land had been lost to the railroad company as aforesaid, “the secretary of the interior directed the manner in which the said railroad company should select the lands in lieu of those so lost; and that, in accordance with the directions so given by the secretary of the interior, the said railroad company did make selection of lands in lieu of many of the lands so lost by them, and in and among other parcels of land the said Northern Pacific Railroad Company did select the particular land above mentioned in making such selection in the manner as directed by the secretary of the interior; and that at the time of the making of such selection as aforesaid the land was wholly unoccupied, and was not subject to any contests, and had not been in any way disposed of or alienated by the United States, but at the time of the said selection thereof the said United States had fall title to said land.” The complaint avers that after the land in question had been selected by the company as above stated, and in September, 1876, the railroad company sold and conveyed the same to the plaintiffs, and that ever since such conveyance to plaintiffs “they have been the owners of said lend in equity if not law,” and have a right to a deed patent to thesame. The complaint also states that long subsequent to such conveyances to plaintiffs, to-wit, in the month of October, 1887, “the defendant wrongfully and unlawfully entered upon
