Arthur Edmonds, J. P. Clark, John Brenenion and Patrick Kelly, sueing for themselves and in behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs and Appellants v. PETER Hersranpson, C. A. Dicness, Albert Olson, G. A. Harstad and A. Steenson, as the Board of County Commissioners in and for said County of Traill; Knut J. Nomland, as Treasurer of said County; Asa Sargent, as Register of Deeds in and for said County; Oliver P. Clark, as Clerk of the District Court in and for said County; H. A. Langlie, as Auditor of said County; Sven N. Heskin, as Sheriff of said County; J. O. Kjelsberg, as Judge of Probate of said County; and F. W. Ames, as States Attorney of said County, Defendants and Respondents.
Constitutional Law—Special Acts—Change of County Seat—Legislative Powers.
1. Chapter 56 of the Laws of 1890, regulating the relocation of county seats, is unconstitutional, as being repugnant to § 69 of article 2 of the state constitution, prohibiting special legislation locating or changing county seats, because it arbitrarily classifies counties, putting into one class all counties, wherein at the date of the act the court house and jail were worth the sum of 35,000, and forever excluding from this class all counties coming within its description in the future, placing all such counties permanently in a separate class.
2. The constitutional inhibition against special legislation does not prevent classification, but such classification must be natural, not arbitrary; it must stand upon some reason, having regard to the character of the legislation of which it is a feature.
3. It is not the form, but the effect, of a statute which determincs ite special character.
4. An act relating to all the objects to which it should relate, except one, is as much special legislation as it it had embraced only the object excluded.
5. It is purely a legislative question, subject to no review by the courts, whether in a given case a general or special law should be enacted under § 70 of article 2of the state constitution, which provides that “in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable no special law shall be enacted.”
(Opinion tiled Dec. 5, 1891, Rehearing denied Jan. 12, 1892.)
