settling a bill can be legitimately exercised by the district court only upon the conditions stated in said section—i, e., “upon good cause shown in furtherance of justice;” and further insist that the cause shown in this case was wholly insufficient to excuse the laches and default of the plaintiff in not procuring the settlement of the bill within the periods allowed therefor by statute, or within any reasonable time after the trial. Upon the other hand, counsel for the appellant claims that the cause shown is good cause, and that the extension of time was in furtherance of justice, because, as counsel claims, the errors at the trial were numerous and gross. Counsel especially urges upon our consideration the fact that the motion for a new trial, which he made in July, 1887, was not decided until April, 1890, and that this fact operated powerfully upon the district court in granting the extension of time, and was a part of the cause shown for such extension. In this behalf counsel claims that his laches did not begin to operate against him until after his alleged motion for a new trial was decided. But counsel offers no explanation of the delay (other than that set out in his affidavit showing cause) which occurred in applying for an extension of time after the motion was denied, and before April 3, 1891—a period of about one year. Before counsel moved to dismiss his first appeal to this court, which motion was made in October, 1890, he certainly became aware of the fact that a bill of exceptious would be essential ta a review of the alleged errors occurring at the trial, and yet no attempt is made to excuse the neglect involved in not moving in that direction until long after such dismissal, and not until April, 1891. The excuse of ignorance or “misconstruction” of the law requiring the settlement of a bill is not even offered to explain the last-mentioned period of inactivity, which period covered fully five months’ time. Nor can we endorse the view advanced by counsel that under the circumstances of this case his obligation to settle a bill of exceptions did not arise until the entry of judgment on April 29,1890. That would be true, possibly, in a case where no motion for a new trial is intended to be made. In this casea motion was made and argued by plaintiff's counsel, and such motion was denied, and the order of denial was appealed from.
