difficulty lies in ascertaining just what result follows this omission. The statute gives us no light upon that subject, nor has the point ever been adjudicated by the court of last resort in this jurisdiction, nor do we find the specific point passed upon by any court under a statute similar to ours. We are left to such light as we may obtain from general principles and the design and purpose of the enactment. It has been held in New York, in Jackson’ v. Young, 5 Cow. 269; and in Minnesota, in Barnes v. Kerlinger, 7 Minn. 82 (Gill. 55), under statutes requiring a sheriff's certificate of sale of realty under execution, that such statutes were directory only, and that an entire omission of the certificate would not invalidate the sale. And in Massachusetts, in Robbins v. Rice, 7 Gray, 202, under a statute requiring a sheriff in certain cases of sale of real estate to have his proceedings under the execution recorded in the proper office before he returned his executiun, it was held that such requirement was for the protection of subsequent attaching creditors and bona fide purchasers, and that the defendant bad no interest in its fulfillment. After full consideration we reach the conclusion that the principle of those cases must apply to this case. The mortgagor who executes a mortgage containing a power of sale is bound to know of his own default, and bound to know that by such default the power executed by him becomes as active and efficient in applying the mortgaged property to the payment of the debt secured as would a decree of court, and he is as much bound to take notice of all that is subsequently done under such power as he would be of all subsequent proceedings under a decree of foreclosure; and having, in law, full knowledge of the time, place, manner and amount of the sale under the power, he cannot be benefited in any manner by filing the duplicate certificate, or prejudiced by the failure to file it. The duplicate certificate is to be filed by the person making the sale, and over whom the purchaser has no control, and it may be filed at any time within ten days after the purchaser has parted with his money. It would not be right or reasonable to hold that the purchaser’s rights could be destroyed by the subsequent negligence of the person making the sale, and against which the purchaser is powerless to guard.
