Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 2).pdf/467

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BOSTWICK v. RAILWAY CO.
441

except for willful injury to the horse by defendant. Patterson’s Railroad Accident Law, § 199; Van Horn v. Railroad Co., 18 N. W. Rep. 679; Harlan v. Railroad Co., 64 Mo. 480; Darling. v. Railroad Co., 121 Mass. 118; Railroad Co. v. Waterson, 4 Ohio St. 424; Bush v. Brainard, 1 Cow. 78; Wright v. Railroad Co., 2 Amer. & Eng. R. Cases, 121; Leary v. Railroad Co., 3 Id 498; Railroad Co. v. Brunson, 19 Id 42; Railroad Co. v. Howard’s Ad., 19 Id 98; Schittenhelms v. Railroad Co., 19 Id 111; Railroad Co. v. Hetherington, 83 Ill. 510; Maynard v. Railroad Co., 115 Mass. 458; Volkman v. Railroad Co., 37 N. W. Rep. 731. The rule stated is the general rule and is the rule in a large majority of the states. Patterson’s Railway Accident Law, § 204; Palmer v. Railroad Co., 33 N. W. Rep. 731; Scheffler v. Railroad Qo., 21 N. W. Rep. 711. The fact that plaintiff's horse escaped from his barn and was wrongfully on the highway, of itself as a question of law, establishes his neg- ligence and would be a bar to a recovery even if defendant had been guilty of negligence. Hance v. Railroad Co., 26 N. Y. 428. The defendant was not guilty of negligence, as it was not bound to keep a lookout for animals wrongfully at large. McAllister v. Railroad Co., 19 Amer. & Eng. R. Cases, 108; Railroad Co. v. Graham, 12 Id 77; Railroad Co. v. Richards, 12 Id 70; Locke v. Railroad Co., 15 Minn. 297. It was not bound to ring its bell at the crossing, for there is no statute requiring it, and if there was defendent did not owe such duty to a trespasser. Harty v. Railroad Co., 42 N. Y. 468; Rosenberg v. Railroad Co., 15 Amer. & Eng. R. Cases 448; Elwood v. Railroad Co., 4 Hun. 808. Defendant was not bound to stop its train. Railroad Co. v. Champ, 75 Ill. 577; Edson y. Railroad Co., 40 Iowa 47; Railroad Co. v. Ganote, 13 Amer. & Eng. R. Cases, 519; Railroad Co. v. Wren, 43 Ill. 77; Railroad Co. v. Bradfield, 63 IL 220.

McCumber & Bogart, for respondent:

The question of what facts constitute negligence, or want of ordinary care, is one for the jury. Railroad Co. v. Doggett, 7 So. Rep. 278; Kent v. Railroad Co., 7 So. Rep. 391; Railroad Co. v. Watson, 7 So. Rep. 813; Railroad Co. v. Nash, 24 N. E. Rep. 884; Hanna v. Railroad Co. 21 N. E. Rep. 903; Railroad Co. v.