class of proceedings which are provided to secure obedience to the necessary processes of courts in civil cases. It adjudged the party guilty of willful disobedience of the injunction, and required him to pay a fine, under peril of imprisonment. It did not stop here. It expressly awarded to the complainant the costs and expenses incurred in prosecuting the contempt, and which were fixed in it at $10. This part of the order cannot be reconciled with the claim of the appellee that the prosecution of the contempt was only carried on by the complainant as the friend of the court, and that the infliction was for the sole purpose of vindicating the authority of the court. The essential character of the proceeding indicates very clearly that what was sought to be accomplished, and in fact done, was to be in keeping with the purpose of the statute which has been referred to.”
In Wisconsin, as in New York and Michigan, there exist statutes providing for the punishment of contempt for the benefit of the injured party. The same distinction is there made. If the proceeding is carried on for the benefit of the successful litigant, the remedy is a special proceeding, and the order is appealable. Said the court in State v. Giles, 10 Wis. 101: “This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court of Jefferson county by which the sheriff was adjudged guilty of contempt for not executing a writ of assistance, and fined ten dollars and costs. The general rule in relation to conviction for contempt is that there is no appeal. But there is a very clear distinction between those proceedings for contempt which are merely in the nature of civil remedies for the benefit of the party injured, and those ai med at conduct which tends directly to interrupt the proceedings and impair the authority of the court. In respect to the latter, it is essential to the very object of granting the power to punish for contempt that it should not be subject to appeal. Such being the general rule, the order in this case would not be appealable without an express statutory provision.” The same distinction is stated In re Pierce, 44 Wis. 411-422; State v. Brophy, 38 Wis. 414; and Inve Murphy, 39 Wis. 286. This last case is peculiarlyin point. The appeal was from an order punishing the appellant for contempt in dis-
