efficacy, and thus the government be brought to anarchy. But it does not at all follow that, because the state alone has any interest in the punishment of such a contempt, the power to punish it does not reside exclusively in the tribunal insulted or defied. On the contrary, there has been only one thought touching this question. All the cases speak of this power as being lodged in only the tribunal toward which the contempt is directed. Rap. Contempt, § 13, and cases cited.
A superior court, unless such authority is clearly conferred, should not be regarded as having been invested with power by an appeal to punish for such a contempt directed against an inferior court or to discharge one whom such inferior court has adjudged guilty of such acontempt. Of course, when the order is void, the contemnor may be released from imprisonment or the payment of a fine. Whether the remedy is habeas corpus or certiorari, or whether either may be resorted to, we do not decide. We do not believe that such a contempt proceeding was intended to be designated as a “remedy,” in the sense in which that word is employed in defining a special proceeding. We hold thata contempt proceeding, whose sale object is to vindicate the authority of the court, is not such a remedy, and therefore that the proceeding is not a special proceeding. It is immaterial what is the character of the act punished—whether it is defiance in open court or disobedience to the mandate of the court in some action or proceeding therein. The object of the contempt proceeding determines its character. The proceeding culminating in the order appealed from was one in which, as we have already seen, the person in whose favor was made the injunctional order disobeyed had no interest whatever; nor could he, under our laws, have any possible interest therein. See, as stating clearly the distinction between criminal and civil contempts, State v. District Court, 40 Minn. 5, 42 N. W. Rep. 598; People v. Court of Oyer and Terminer, 101 N. Y. 245, 4 N. E. Rep. 259; In re Chiles, 22 Wall. 157. As we have reached the conclusion that the appeal must be dismissed, we are not at liberty to pass upon the merits. The order provides for imprisonment in case the fine is not paid. In case it is thus enforced, and perhaps if it is not thus enforced, the appellant
