for the purposes of this opinion, that the plaintiff is bound by the language contained in those conveyances to the same extent that his grantors were bound. It does not certainly appear in what manner the main line crosses this quarter section, or whether or not it intersects both the north and south half thereof, but it does appear that this branch line crosses the tract diagonally near the center; hence it is certain that both lines must to some extent run upon the same subdivision as originally conveyed by defendant. The reservation is of "a strip of land * * * of the width of four hundred feet, that is, two hundred feet on each side of the center line of the Northern Pacific Railroad, or any of its branches, to be reserved for right of way, * * * in case the line of said railroad, or any of its branches, has been or shall be located on or over * * * said described premises." This language covers but one strip. If the line of the defendant's road had already been located across the land when the conveyance was made, then the language simply reserved the right of way for such line. If the line was subsequently located, its location at once fixed the limits of the reservation, and exhausted its extent. In neither case was there anything left on whıch to base a claim for right of way for a branch road. The language will not bear extension beyond its plain import. Should we hold that it could be construed to mean two strips, each of four hundred feet in width, simply because the defendant operates two lınes across this tract, then we would be forced to hold that it could be construed to mean as many such strips as could be surveyed within the limits of the tract, should the defendant at any future time desire to operate that number of lines across said tract. No one would contend for such a construction.
But, to our minds, there is another and broader reason why defendant can in this action assert no claim under the reservation in the conveyances to plaintiff's grantors. Such reservations neither created or preserved any rights of the James River Valley Railroad Company. When that company entered upon and located its line of road across plaintiff's land it was, and still is, a stranger to such reservation. Nor could such location define or fix the limits to any rights or estate of this
