whose letters on the subject of the interference of the Crown with the Cabinet, originally published in a newspaper had, when published in a collected form, in 1878 reached the twentieth thousand, says:—
"Those who remember the Crimean War, may also perhaps remember that the immediate cause of it, so far as we are concerned, was the interpretation attached by Russia to the Vienna Note, after it had been accepted by all parties except Turkey. A despatch from Count Nesselrode made it clear that Russia understood the Note in the sense which the Turkish Government alleged it was capable of bearing—a sense different from that in which it had been accepted by the other Powers. This difficulty might have been overcome by further negotiation, but the cry went forth that Russia had tried to deceive us, and the indignation roused by Russia's supposed treachery made war inevitable. We learn now that this was the court view. As soon as Count Nesselrode's despatch was made known we are told that 'not an hour was lost by the Queen and Prince,' in making Lord Aberdeen aware of their views as to the course now to be adopted. It is no surprise to be told that their views prevailed, and that the arguments which dropped from the Royal pen were 'adopted and carried out in detail by Lord Clarendon in a despatch to Sir George Hamilton Seymour, at St. Petersburg, on the 30th of September.' In a letter to Baron Stockmar, two days after this communication of the Queen's views to the Cabinet, the Prince referring to Russia, speaks of 'the cloven foot,' of the 'cat let out of the bag,' of the Vienna Note as 'a trap' set for us, with the connivance of Austria, and of the folly of acting as if our anta-
