for since M was truly asserted not to be with some certain O, even if it is present with no O; yet being present with no O, there was not a syllogism, it is evident, that neither now will there be one. Again, let them be affirmative, and let the universal be similarly assumed, e. g. let M be present with every N, and with a certain O, N may happen therefore to be present, both with every and with no O, let the terms of being present with none, be "white," "swan," "snow;" but we cannot assume the terms of being present with every, for the reason which we have before stated, but it may be shown from the indefinite. But if the universal be joined to the minor extreme, and M is present with no O, and is not present with some certain N, it is possible for N to be present with every and with no O; let the terms of presence be "white," "animal," "crow," but of absence, "white," "stone," "crow." But if the propositions are affirmative, let the terms of absence be "white," "animal," "snow," of presence, "white," "animal," "swan." Therefore it is evident, when the propositions are of the same quality, and the one universal, but the other particular, that there is by no means a syllogism. Neither, however, will there be one, if a thing be present to some one of each term, or not present, or to the one, but not to the other, or to neither universally, or indefinitely, let the common terms of all be "white," "animal," "man;" "white," "animal," "inanimate."
Wherefore it is evident, from what we have stated, that if the terms subsist towards each other, as has been said, there is necessarily a syllogism, and if there be a syllogism, the terms must thus subsist. It is also clear that all syllogisms
