present with a certain C. since if it is present with every C, but is contingent to no B, neither will B be contingently present with any A. So that if A is present with every C, B is contingent with no C, but it was supposed contingent to a certain C. When however in a negative syllogism the particular affirmative is necessary, as for example B C, or the universal in an affirmative syllogism, e.g. A B, there will not be a syllogism de inesse, the demonstration however is the same as in the former cases. But if the minor premise be universal, whether affirmative or negative and contingent, but the major particular necessary, there will not be a syllogism, let the terms of necessary presence be "animal," "white," "man," and of the non-contingent "animal," "white," "garment." But when the universal is necessary, and the particular contingent, the universal being negative, let the terms of presence be "animal," "white," "crow," and of non-inesse "animal," "white," "pitch."
But when (the universal) affirms let the terms of presence be "animal," "white," "swan," but of the non-contingent be "animal," "white," "snow." Nor will there be a syllogism when indefinite propositions are assumed or both particular, let the common terms, de inesse, be "animal," "white," "man," de non-inesse "animal," "white," "inanimate;" for "animal" is necessarily and not contingently
