many terms and premises, how they subsist with reference to each other, also what sort of problem may be proved in each figure, and what in many and in fewer modes, may be gathered from what has been said.
Chapter 27
We must now describe how we may always obtain a provision of syllogisms for a proposed question, and in what way we may assume principles about each, for perhaps it is not only requisite to consider the production of syllogisms, but also to possess the power of forming them.
Of all beings then, some are of such a nature as not to be truly predicated universally of any thing else, as "Cleon," and "Callias," that which is singular, and that which is sensible, but others are predicated of these, (for each of these is man and animal); some again are predicated of others, but others not previously of these; lastly, there are some which are themselves predicated of others, and others of them, as "man" is predicated of Callias, and "animal" of man. That some things therefore are naturally adapted to be predicated of nothing is clear, for of sensibles each is almost of such a sort, as not to be predicated of any thing except accidentally, for we sometimes say that that white thing is Socrates, and that the object approaching is Callias. But that we must stop somewhere in our upward progression we will again show, for the present let this be admitted. Of these things then we cannot point out another predicate,
