ject is comprehended by a certain thing, the consequents of which we must assume, those which follow or which do not follow the universal, we are not to select in these—for they were assumed in those, since whatever are consequent to "animal," are also consequent to "man," and as to whatever things are not absolutely present with in like manner; but the properties of each thing must be taken, for there are certain properties in species not common to genus, since it is necessary that certain properties should be in different species. Nor are we to select those in regard to the universal, which the thing comprehended follows, as those which "man" follows ought not to be assumed to "animal," for it is necessary if animal follows man that it follows all these, but these more properly belong to the selection of the antecedents of "man." We must also assume those which are generally consequent and antecedent, for of general problems the syllogism also is from propositions, all or some of which are general, as the conclusion of each syllogism resembles its principles. Lastly, we are not to select things consequent to all, since there will not be composed a syllogism from them, on account of a reason which will appear from what follows.
Chapter 28
Those therefore who desire to confirm any thing of a certain universal, should look to the subject matter of what is confirmed, in respect of which it happens to be predicated; but of whatever ought to be predicated, of this, he should examine the consequents; for if one of these happens to be the same, one must necessarily be in the other. But if (it is to be proved) that a thing is not present universally but particularly, he must examine those which each follows, for if any of these is the same, to be particularly present is
