that in such propositions, what relates to habit must always be exchanged and placed for a term instead of habit.
Chapter 35
It is not always necessary to seek to expound the terms by a name, since there will oftentimes be sentences to which no name is attached, wherefore it is difficult to reduce syllogisms of this kind, but we shall sometimes happen to be deceived by such a search, for example, because a syllogism is of things immediate. For let A be two right angles, B a triangle, C an isosceles triangle. A then is with C through B, but no longer with B through any thing else, for a triangle has of itself two right angles, so that there will not be a middle of the proposition A B, which is demonstrable. The middle then must clearly not thus be always assumed, as if it were a particular definite thing, but sometimes a sentence, which happens to be the case in the instance adduced.
Chapter 36
For the first to be in the middle, and the latter in the extreme, it is unnecessary to assume as if they were always predicated of each other, or in like manner, the first cf the middle, and this in
