take what may be supposed and what may be opined, as terms.
Chapter 40
Since however it is not the same, for pleasure to be good, and for pleasure to be the good, we must not set the terms alike; but if there is a syllogism that pleasure is the good, the good (must be taken as a term) if that it is good, good (must be taken), and so of the rest.
Chapter 41
It is neither in fact nor in word the same thing to assert that A is present with every individual with which B is present, and to say that A is present with every individual of what B is present with, since there is nothing to prevent B from being with C, yet not with every C. For instance, let B be beautiful, but C white, if then beautiful is with something white, it is true to say that beauty is present with what is white, yet not perhaps with every thing white. If then A is with B, but not with every thing of which B is predicated, neither if B is present with every C, nor if it is alone present, it is necessary that A should not only not be present with every C, but that it should not be present (at all), but if that of which B is truly predicated, with every individual of this A is present, it will happen that A will be predicated of every individual of which B is predicated of every individual. But if A is predicated of that of which B is universally predicated, there is nothing to prevent B from being present with C with not every or with no individual of which A is present, therefore in (three terms it is evident that) the assertion that A is predicated of every individual of which B is predicated, signifies that of whatever B is predi-
