with every thing with which B is, he knows also that it is with C; still nothing prevents his being ignorant of the existence of C, as if A were two right angles, B a triangle, and C a perceptible triangle. For a man may think that C does not exist, knowing that every triangle has two (equal to) right angles, hence he will know and be ignorant of the same thing at once; for to know that every triangle has angles equal to two right, is not a simple thing, but in one respect arises from possessing universal science, in another, particular science. Thus therefore he knows by universal science, that C has angles equal to two right angles, but by particular science he does not know it, so that he will not hold contraries. In like manner is the reasoning in the Meno, that discipline is reminiscence, for it never happens that we have a pre-existent knowledge of particulars, but together with induction, receive the science of particulars as it were by recognition; since some things we immediately know, as (that there are angles) equal to two right angles, if we know that (what we see) is a triangle, and in like manner as to other things.
By universal knowledge then we observe particulars, but we do not know them by an (innate)
