very silly. For neither does this happen in evident disciplines, nor is it possible in analysis, since immediate propositions are principles, and another conclusion arises, when an immediate proposition is assumed. If however any one should say that the first immediate propositions are the same principles, there is one in each genus, but if it is neither possible that any thing can be demonstrated as it ought to be from all (principles), nor that they should be so different, as that there should be different ones of each science, it remains that the principles of all are the same in genus, but that from different principles different sciences (are demonstrated). Now this is evidently impossible, for it has been shown that the principles are different in genus of those things which are generically different, for principles are two-fold, viz. from which and about which, those indeed from which are common, but those about which are peculiar, for instance, number and magnitude.
Chapter 33
The object of scientific knowledge and science (itself) differs from the object of opinion, and from opinion, because science is universal, and subsists through things necessary, and what is necessary cannot subsist otherwise than it does: some things however are true, and subsist, yet may possibly subsist otherwise. It is evident then that science is not conversant with these, (for else things which are capable of subsisting otherwise could not possibly subsist otherwise). Yet neither is intellect conversant with such, (for I call intellect the principle of science,) nor indemonstrable science, and this is the notion of an imme-
