Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 1 (1853).djvu/44

any thing of such matters, who has not frequently considered them, yet to have submitted each of them to inquiry, is not without its use.^[1]

Chap. VIII.—Of the Quale and of Quality.^[2]

1. Quality and its species; the latter of four kinds. 1st, Habit and disposition—these explained.By quality, I mean that, according to which, certain things, are said to be, what they are. Quality, however, is among those things which are predicated multifariously; hence one species of quality is called "habit" and "disposition," but habit, differs from disposition, in that it is a thing more lasting and stable.^[3] Of this kind too, are both the sciences and the virtues,^[4] for science appears to rank among those things, which continue more stable, and are hardly removed, even when science is but moderately attained, unless some great change should occur from disease, or from something of the sort; so also virtue, as justice, temperance, and so forth, does not appear capable of being moved or changed with facility. But those are termed dispositions, which are easily moved and quickly changed, as heat, cold, disease, health, and such things; or a man is disposed, after a manner, according to these, but is rapidly changed, from hot becoming cold, and from health passing to disease, and in like manner as to other things, unless some one of these qualities has, from

1. Cf. Metaph. lib. iv. c. 15.
2. Ποιότης. Def. "That which imparts what is apparent in matter, and what is the object of sense." Taylor's Explanation of Aristotelian Terms. See also Metaphys. lib. iv. c. 14, 19, and 20, Leip. The distinction in the text has been remarked upon, as exemplifying Aristotle's passion for definition, but it would be more correct to remember that it was perhaps less his inclination than his judgment, which induced him to lay down strict notions of verbal definition primarily, knowing that the thing signified, or idea, could never hold its proper position in the mind, if any doubt existed as to the meaning of the term of verbal symbol of it, ab origine. It is a great pity that modern controversialists so frequently neglect this.
3. Cf. Ethics, book ii. ch. 5, and book ii. ch. 1. In the latter place, Aristotle shows that moral virtues arise from habit, in opposition to Plato, who taught that the virtues were not produced by learning or nature, but were divinely bestowed. Aristotle's opinion resembled Locke's in the denial of innate ideas, the soul having nothing within it but inclination, τὸ πεφυκὸς. The student will profitably refer here to Bishop Butler's Analogy, on the growth of mental habits. Anal. part i. ch. 5. Bohn's Stand. Lib.
4. So Cicero, de Off. lib. iii., connects these two, "temperantia est scientia." See also Montaigne's Essays, ch. xl. b. i., and ch. ii. b. iiii.