mentioned at first, because they are evident; e.g. that "to have," signifies to be shod, to be armed; "where," as in the Lycæum, in the Forum, and the rest which are spoken of these. Of the proposed genera therefore, sufficient has been stated.
Chap. X.—Of Opposites.[1]
1. Opposites are of four kinds. We must now speak of opposites, in how many ways opposition takes place. One thing then is said to be opposed to another in four ways, either as relative, or as contrary, or as privation and habit, or as affirmation and negation. Thus speaking summarily, each thing of this kind is opposed, relatively, as "the double" to "the half," contrarily, as "evil" to "good," privatively and habitually, as "blindness" and "sight," affirmatively and negatively, as "he sits," "he does not sit."
1. Relative opposition. Whatever things then are relatively opposed, are said to be what they are with reference to opposites, or are in some manner referred to them, as "the double of the half," is said to be what it is, with reference to something else, for it is said to be the double of something; and "knowledge" is opposed relatively to the object of knowledge, and is said to be what it is, in reference to what may be known, and what may be known, is said to be what it is, in reference to an opposite, namely, "knowledge," for "the object of knowledge" is said to be so, to something, namely, to "knowledge."
- ↑ For a brief exposition of this chapter, the reader is referred to the nature and laws of logical opposition in necessary, impossible, and contingent matter, given in Aldrich, Huyshe, Whately, Hill, and Mansel. It will be remembered however that he here speaks of the opposition of terms, the rules for the opposition of propositions being more especially considered in the Interpretation: still a reference to that treatise, as well as to the authors cited above, will be useful, as elucidating the grounds on which all logical opposition is founded. Archytas (says Simplicius) does not omit, but seems to have more accurately explained the differences of contraries adduced by Aristotle. He says: Of contraries, some are in the genera of genera, as good and evil, the first being the genus of the virtues, the second of the vices: some again in the genera of species, as virtue to vice, the first being the genus of prudence, temperance, etc.; the other of imprudence, intemperance: lastly, some in species, as fortitude to timidity, etc.: but he adds, "there is nothing to prevent the contraries of genera being reduced under one genus, as good and evil under quality."
