of habit and privation. of something identical, as sight and blindness of the eye, and universally, in whatever the habit is naturally adapted to be produced, of such is either predicated. We say then, that each of the things capable of receiving habit is deprived of it, when it is not in that, wherein it might naturally be, and when it is adapted naturally to possess it; thus we say that a man is toothless, not because he has no teeth, and blind, not because he has no sight, but because he has them not, when he might naturally have them, for some persons from their birth, have neither sight nor teeth, yet they are neither called toothless nor blind. 1. Distinction in the meaning of habitual and privative opposition. To be deprived of, and to possess habit, then, are not privation and habit, for the sight is habit, but the privation is blindness, but to possess sight is not sight, nor to be blind, blindness, for blindness is a certain privation, but the being blind is to be deprived, and is not privation, for if blindness were the same as being blind, both might be predicated of the same person, but a man is said to be blind, yet he is never called blindness. To be deprived also, and to possess habit, appear to be similarly opposed, as privation and habit, since the mode of opposition is the same, for as blindness is opposed to sight, so likewise is the being blind, opposed to the possession of sight.[1]
4. Opposition of affirmative and negative. Neither is that, which falls under affirmation and negation, affirmation and negation; for affirmation is an affirmative sentence, and negation a negative- ↑ This opposition between propositions is said to be as to their quality; to this may be appended that contrariety of quality which exists between two particulars, properly called the opposition of sub-contraries. It may here be observed, that though this last-named form of contrariety is admitted by Aristotle (Int. ch. 7,) he does not use the term ὑπεναντιως as expressive of it, but calls in Anal. Prior, ii. 15, an opposition κατὰ τὴν λέξιν. The term is used by the Greek commentators, (Ammonius Schol. p. 115, a. 15,) Boethius Int. ad Syll. p. 564. A poetical example of the mutual subversion of some relative opposites may be found in Shakespeare's King John, act iii. scene I:
"Indirection thereby grows indirect,
And falsehood falsehood cures: as fire cools fire
Within the scorched veins of one new burn'd."
and Negative words are given in Hill's logic, p. 27. Aldritch's definition of the three will be remembered here, namely, that the first signifies the presence of an attribute; the second, its absence from a subject capable of it; the last, its absence from a subject incapable of it. A definite noun and its corresponding indefinite noun together, constitute a perfect division.
