in existence at all. In privation and habit, then when the subject is non-existent, neither is true, but when the subject exists, the one is not always true, nor the other false. "Socrates sees" is opposed to "Socrates is blind," as privation and habit, and whilst he exists, one need not be true or false, for when he is not naturally fitted to possess them, both are false, but when Socrates does not exist at all, both will thus be false, that he sees, and that he is blind. In affirmation and negation always, if Socrates be or be not, one will always be false and the other true; for it is evident with respect to these two, "Socrates is sick," and "Socrates is not sick," that when he exists one of them is true and the other false; and in like manner when he does not exist, for in the latter case that he is ill is false, but that he is not ill is true; so that in those things alone which are affirmatively and negatively opposed will it be the peculiarity that one of them is either true or false.
Chap. XI.—Opposites continued, especially as to the contrariety between the Evil and the Good.
1. Opposition of good and evil. "Evil" is of necessity opposed to good, and this is evident from an induction of singulars, as disease to health, and cowardice to courage, and similarly of the rest. But to evil, at one time, good, is contrary, and at another, evil, for to indigence being an evil, excess is contrary, which is also an evil; Rhet. b. i. c. 7, and Eth. b. ii. c. 2. in like manner, mediocrity, which is a good, is opposed to each of them. A man may perceive this in respect of a few instances, but in the majority the contrary to evil is always good.[1]
2. Where one contrary exists Again, of contraries it is not required, if one is, that the remainder should be; for when every- ↑ Compare note in the preceding chapter relative to the observation of Archytas as to generic and specific contrariety, whence it will be seen that this chapter is nothing else than an elaborations of the principle he lays down. He adds in his treatise on Opposites, "There are three differences of contraries; for some things are opposed as good to evil, as for instance health to sickness, some as evil to evil, as avarice to prodigality, and some as neither to neither, as the white to the black, and the heavy to the light." What he calls "neither," and Aristotle "the negation of extremes," subsequent philosophers called "indifferent," ἀδιάφορα. Comp. Cic. ad Atticum, also Sanct. Chrys. in Ep. ad Ephes. c. 5.
