gation of "it is possible to be," is not "it is possible not to be." Now it results from this that we either at the same time affirm and deny the same thing of the same, or that the affirmations and negations are not made according to the additions, "to be" or "not to be;" if therefore, that, be impossible, this, will be to be taken, wherefore the negation of "it is possible to be," is "it is not possible to be," (but not it is possible not to be). Now there is the same reasoning also about the being contingent, for the negation of this is, not to be contingent, and in like manner as to the rest, for example the necessary and impossible, since as in those it happens that, "to be," and, "not to be," are additions, but "whiteness" and "man" are subjects, so here "to be" and "not to be," become as subjects, but "to be possible," and "to be contingent," are additions which determine the true and false in the (enunciations) "to be possible" and "to be not possible," similarly as in those, "to be," and "not to be." But of "it is possible not to be," the negation is not, "it is not possible to be," but "it is not possible not to be" and of "it is possible to be," the negation is not, " it is possible not to be," but, "it is not possible to be;" wherefore, "it is possible to be," and, "it is possible not to be," will appear to follow each other; for it is the same thing, "to be possible to be," and "not to be," since such things are not contradictories of each other, namely, "it is possible to be," and, "it is possible not to be." But "it is pos-
