are sophistically assumed, to assign the property of some one thing alone; for what is present with something to which any thing happens, will also be present with the accident assumed together with that, to which it is accidental; thus, what is present with man, will also be with white man, if man is white, and what is with white man, will also be with man. Some one however may find fault with many of these properties, if he makes one subject subsistent per se, but another with accident, as if he stated man to be one thing, but white man another, moreover, making the habit another, and that which is enunciated according to the habit. For what is present with habit will also be present with what is denominated according to habit, and what is present with that denominated according to habit, will also be present with habit. Thus, since he who possesses science is said to be scientifically disposed, the property of science would not be the being immutable in opinion by reason, for the man of science will be unpersuadable by reason. In confirmation however it must be stated, that that to which a thing happens, and the accident taken together with that to which it is accidental, are not different simply, but they are said to be so from their essence being different, since it is not the same thing for man to be man, and for a white man to be a white man. Besides, we must inspect cases, stating that neither will he be scientific, who is (a thing) unpersuadable by reason, but he who is unpersuadable by reason, nor is science that which cannot be induced to change its opinion by reason, but the being unchangeable by reason, for he who in every way objects, must in every way be opposed.
Chapter 5
Property is, in the next place, subverted, if he who wishes to assign what is naturally inherent,
