also Xenocrates does not demonstrate, for a happy, and a worthy life, are not one in number, so that it is not necessary they should be the same, because both are most eligible, but that one should be under the other.
Again consider, whether one (of the things proposed) is the same (as a third thing), also whether another (is the same with it), for if both are not the same with it, it is clear that (they are not the same) with each other.
Moreover, observe from the accidents of these, and from those things to which these are accidents, since whatever are accidents to the one, must of necessity be also accidental to the other, and to what one of them happens, the other must also happen; now if any discrepancy subsists amongst these, they are evidently not the same.
Notice also, whether both are not in one genus of category, but the one denotes quality, the other quantity or relation; again, whether the genus of each is not the same, but the one is good, and the other evil, or the one virtue, and the other science: or whether the genus is indeed the same, yet there are not the same differences predicated of each, but of the one, that it is contemplative science, of the other, that it is practical, and so of other things.
Further, from the more, if one indeed receives the more, but the other not, or if both indeed receive it, yet not at the same time; thus he who loves more, does not more desire intercourse, so that love, and the desire of intercourse, are not the same.
Besides, from addition, if each being added to the same, does not make the whole the same, or if the same being taken away from each, the remainder is different; as if some one said, that the double of the half, and the multiple of the half, were the same. For the half being taken away from each, the remainder ought to signify the same, yet it does not, for the double, and the multiple, do not denote the same.
Observe however, not only whether any impossibility now happens on account of the thesis, but also whether it is possible to be from the hy-
